nested works

[proxmark3-svn] / client / cmdhflist.c

diff --git a/client/cmdhflist.c b/client/cmdhflist.c
index 0eaafa68e6e377db5bfa0d1a023cdd6699ace365..eb61c30165fe041f9ca5b321523c797964a51b5b 100644 (file)
--- a/client/cmdhflist.c
+++ b/client/cmdhflist.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
 #include "protocols.h"
 #include "crapto1/crapto1.h"
 #include "mifarehost.h"
 #include "protocols.h"
 #include "crapto1/crapto1.h"
 #include "mifarehost.h"

+#include "mifaredefault.h"

 
 
 enum MifareAuthSeq {
 
 
 enum MifareAuthSeq {


@@ -30,9 +31,9 @@ enum MifareAuthSeq {
        masNt,
        masNrAr,
        masAt,
        masNt,
        masNrAr,
        masAt,

+       masAuthComplete,

        masFirstData,
        masData,
        masFirstData,
        masData,

-       masDataNested,

        masError,
 };
 static enum MifareAuthSeq MifareAuthState;
        masError,
 };
 static enum MifareAuthSeq MifareAuthState;


@@ -42,6 +43,8 @@ void ClearAuthData() {
        AuthData.uid = 0;
        AuthData.nt = 0;
        AuthData.first_auth = true;
        AuthData.uid = 0;
        AuthData.nt = 0;
        AuthData.first_auth = true;

+       AuthData.ks2 = 0;
+       AuthData.ks3 = 0;

 }
 
 /**
 }
 
 /**


@@ -73,9 +76,6 @@ uint8_t mifare_CRC_check(bool isResponse, uint8_t* data, uint8_t len)
 {
        switch(MifareAuthState) {
                case masNone:
 {
        switch(MifareAuthState) {
                case masNone:

-               case masFirstData:
-               case masData:
-               case masDataNested:

                case masError:
                        return iso14443A_CRC_check(isResponse, data, len);
                default:
                case masError:
                        return iso14443A_CRC_check(isResponse, data, len);
                default:


@@ -89,7 +89,6 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
        {
        case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:        
                snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); 
        {
        case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:        
                snprintf(exp,size,"WUPA"); 

-               MifareAuthState = masNone;

                break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT:{
                // 93 20 = Anticollision (usage: 9320 - answer: 4bytes UID+1byte UID-bytes-xor)
                break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT:{
                // 93 20 = Anticollision (usage: 9320 - answer: 4bytes UID+1byte UID-bytes-xor)


@@ -115,7 +114,6 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
        }
        case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:                
                snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); 
        }
        case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:                
                snprintf(exp,size,"REQA"); 

-               MifareAuthState = masNone;

                break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_READBLOCK:   snprintf(exp,size,"READBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_WRITEBLOCK:  snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
                break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_READBLOCK:   snprintf(exp,size,"READBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;
        case ISO14443A_CMD_WRITEBLOCK:  snprintf(exp,size,"WRITEBLOCK(%d)",cmd[1]); break;


@@ -189,6 +187,17 @@ void annotateIso14443a(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize)
 }
 
 void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t* parity, uint8_t paritysize, bool isResponse) {
 }
 
 void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t* parity, uint8_t paritysize, bool isResponse) {

+       if (!isResponse && cmdsize == 1) {
+               switch(cmd[0]) {
+                       case ISO14443A_CMD_WUPA:        
+                       case ISO14443A_CMD_REQA:                
+                               MifareAuthState = masNone;
+                               break;
+                       default:
+                               break;
+               }
+       }
+       

        // get UID
        if (MifareAuthState == masNone) {
                if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) {
        // get UID
        if (MifareAuthState == masNone) {
                if (cmdsize == 9 && cmd[0] == ISO14443A_CMD_ANTICOLL_OR_SELECT && cmd[1] == 0x70) {


@@ -231,7 +240,7 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8
                case masAt:
                        if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
                                snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at (enc)");
                case masAt:
                        if (cmdsize == 4 && isResponse) {
                                snprintf(exp,size,"AUTH: at (enc)");

-                               MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
+                               MifareAuthState = masAuthComplete;

                                AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
                                AuthData.at_enc_par = parity[0];
                                return;
                                AuthData.at_enc = bytes_to_num(cmd, 4);
                                AuthData.at_enc_par = parity[0];
                                return;


@@ -243,51 +252,216 @@ void annotateMifare(char *exp, size_t size, uint8_t* cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8
                        break;
        }
        
                        break;
        }
        

-       if (!isResponse)
+       if (!isResponse && ((MifareAuthState == masNone) || (MifareAuthState == masError)))

                annotateIso14443a(exp, size, cmd, cmdsize);
        
 }
 
                annotateIso14443a(exp, size, cmd, cmdsize);
        
 }
 

-bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) {
+bool DecodeMifareData(uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity, bool isResponse, uint8_t *mfData, size_t *mfDataLen) {
+       static struct Crypto1State *traceCrypto1;       
+       static uint64_t mfLastKey;
+       

        *mfDataLen = 0;
        
        *mfDataLen = 0;
        

+       if (MifareAuthState == masAuthComplete) {
+               if (traceCrypto1) {
+                       crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
+                       traceCrypto1 = NULL;
+               }
+
+               MifareAuthState = masFirstData;
+               return false;
+       }
+       

        if (cmdsize > 32)
                return false;
        
        if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) {
                if (AuthData.first_auth) {
        if (cmdsize > 32)
                return false;
        
        if (MifareAuthState == masFirstData) {
                if (AuthData.first_auth) {

-                       uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64);
-                       uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
-                       struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
-                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
-                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
-                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.nr_enc, 1);
-                       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, AuthData.uid ^ AuthData.nt, 0);
-
-                       uint64_t lfsr = 0;
-                       crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
-                       crypto1_destroy(revstate);
-//                     LastKey = lfsr;
-                       printf("uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
-                       printf("AUTH: probable key:%x%x Prng:%s ks2:%08x ks3:%08x\n", 
-                               (unsigned int)((lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF00000000) >> 32), (unsigned int)(lfsr & 0xFFFFFFFF), 
-                               validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARDEND",
-                               ks2,
-                               ks3);
+                       AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 64);
+                       AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 96);
+
+                       mfLastKey = GetCrypto1ProbableKey(&AuthData);
+                       PrintAndLog("            |          * | key | probable key:%010"PRIx64" Prng:%s   ks2:%08x ks3:%08x |     |", 
+                               mfLastKey,
+                               validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt) ? "WEAK": "HARD",
+                               AuthData.ks2,
+                               AuthData.ks3);

                        
                        AuthData.first_auth = false;
                        
                        AuthData.first_auth = false;

+
+                       traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);

                } else {
                } else {

+                       if (traceCrypto1) {
+                               crypto1_destroy(traceCrypto1);
+                               traceCrypto1 = NULL;
+                       }
+
+                       // check last used key
+                       if (false && mfLastKey) {
+                               if (NestedCheckKey(mfLastKey, &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize, parity)) {
+                                       PrintAndLog("            |          * | key | last used key:%010"PRIx64"            ks2:%08x ks3:%08x |     |", 
+                                               mfLastKey,
+                                               AuthData.ks2,
+                                               AuthData.ks3);
+
+                               traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
+                               };
+                       }
+                       
+                       // check default keys
+                       if (false && !traceCrypto1) {
+                               for (int defaultKeyCounter = 0; defaultKeyCounter < MifareDefaultKeysSize; defaultKeyCounter++){
+                                       if (NestedCheckKey(MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter], &AuthData, cmd, cmdsize, parity)) {
+                                               PrintAndLog("            |          * | key | default key:%010"PRIx64"              ks2:%08x ks3:%08x |     |", 
+                                                       MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter],
+                                                       AuthData.ks2,
+                                                       AuthData.ks3);
+
+                                               mfLastKey = MifareDefaultKeys[defaultKeyCounter];
+                                               traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
+                                               break;
+                                       };
+                               }
+                       }
+                       
+                       // nested
+                       if (!traceCrypto1 && validate_prng_nonce(AuthData.nt)) {
+                               uint32_t ntx = prng_successor(AuthData.nt, 90); 
+                               for (int i = 0; i < 16383; i++) {
+                                       ntx = prng_successor(ntx, 1);
+                                       if (NTParityChk(&AuthData, ntx)){
+
+                                               uint32_t ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 64);
+                                               uint32_t ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ prng_successor(ntx, 96);
+                                               struct Crypto1State *pcs = lfsr_recovery64(ks2, ks3);
+                                               memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
+                                               mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
+                               
+                                               crypto1_destroy(pcs);
+                                               if (CheckCrypto1Parity(cmd, cmdsize, mfData, parity) && CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, mfData, cmdsize)) {
+                                                       AuthData.ks2 = ks2;
+                                                       AuthData.ks3 = ks3;
+
+                                                       AuthData.nt = ntx;
+                                                       mfLastKey = GetCrypto1ProbableKey(&AuthData);
+                                                       PrintAndLog("            |          * | key | nested probable key:%010"PRIx64"      ks2:%08x ks3:%08x |     |", 
+                                                               mfLastKey,
+                                                               AuthData.ks2,
+                                                               AuthData.ks3);
+
+                                                       traceCrypto1 = lfsr_recovery64(AuthData.ks2, AuthData.ks3);
+                                                       break;
+                                               }
+                                       }                                               
+                               }
+                       }
+                       
+                       //hardnested
+                       if (!traceCrypto1) {
+                               printf("hardnested not implemented. uid:%x nt:%x ar_enc:%x at_enc:%x\n", AuthData.uid, AuthData.nt, AuthData.ar_enc, AuthData.at_enc);
+                       }

                }
                
                
                
                MifareAuthState = masData;
                }
                
                
                
                MifareAuthState = masData;

-               return true;

        }
        
        }
        

-       if (MifareAuthState == masData) {
+       if (MifareAuthState == masData && traceCrypto1) {
+               memcpy(mfData, cmd, cmdsize);
+               mf_crypto1_decrypt(traceCrypto1, mfData, cmdsize, 0);
+               *mfDataLen = cmdsize;

        }
        
        return *mfDataLen > 0;
 }
 
        }
        
        return *mfDataLen > 0;
 }
 

+bool NTParityChk(TAuthData *ad, uint32_t ntx) {
+       if (
+               (oddparity8(ntx >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ntx & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ntx >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ntx >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ntx >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->nt_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->nt_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
+               )
+               return false;
+       
+       uint32_t ar = prng_successor(ntx, 64);
+       if (
+               (oddparity8(ar >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (ar & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ar >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(ar >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (ar >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->ar_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
+               )
+               return false;
+
+       uint32_t at = prng_successor(ntx, 96);
+       if (
+               (oddparity8(ar & 0xff) ^ (at >> 24 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->ar_enc_par >> 4) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 24 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(at >> 8 & 0xff) ^ (at & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 5) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(at >> 16 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 8 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 6) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 8 & 0x01)) ||
+               (oddparity8(at >> 24 & 0xff) ^ (at >> 16 & 0x01) ^ ((ad->at_enc_par >> 7) & 0x01) ^ (ad->at_enc >> 16 & 0x01))
+               )
+               return false;
+               
+       return true;
+}
+
+bool NestedCheckKey(uint64_t key, TAuthData *ad, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *parity) {
+       uint8_t buf[32] = {0};
+       struct Crypto1State *pcs;
+       
+       AuthData.ks2 = 0;
+       AuthData.ks3 = 0;
+
+       pcs = crypto1_create(key);
+       uint32_t nt1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nt_enc ^ ad->uid, 1) ^ ad->nt_enc;
+       uint32_t ar = prng_successor(nt1, 64);
+       uint32_t at = prng_successor(nt1, 96);
+
+       crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1);
+//     uint32_t nr1 = crypto1_word(pcs, ad->nr_enc, 1) ^ ad->nr_enc;  // if needs deciphered nr
+       uint32_t ar1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->ar_enc;
+       uint32_t at1 = crypto1_word(pcs, 0, 0) ^ ad->at_enc;
+
+       if (!(ar == ar1 && at == at1 && NTParityChk(ad, nt1)))
+               return false;
+
+       memcpy(buf, cmd, cmdsize);
+       mf_crypto1_decrypt(pcs, buf, cmdsize, 0);
+       
+       crypto1_destroy(pcs);
+       
+       if (!CheckCrypto1Parity(cmd, cmdsize, buf, parity))
+               return false;
+
+       if(!CheckCrc14443(CRC_14443_A, buf, cmdsize)) 
+               return false;
+       
+       AuthData.nt = nt1;
+       AuthData.ks2 = AuthData.ar_enc ^ ar;
+       AuthData.ks3 = AuthData.at_enc ^ at;
+
+       return true;
+}
+
+bool CheckCrypto1Parity(uint8_t *cmd_enc, uint8_t cmdsize, uint8_t *cmd, uint8_t *parity_enc) {
+       for (int i = 0; i < cmdsize - 1; i++) {
+               if (oddparity8(cmd[i]) ^ (cmd[i + 1] & 0x01) ^ ((parity_enc[i / 8] >> (7 - i % 8)) & 0x01) ^ (cmd_enc[i + 1] & 0x01))
+                       return false;
+       }
+       
+       return true;
+}
+
+uint64_t GetCrypto1ProbableKey(TAuthData *ad) {
+       struct Crypto1State *revstate = lfsr_recovery64(ad->ks2, ad->ks3);
+       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, 0, 0);
+       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, ad->nr_enc, 1);
+       lfsr_rollback_word(revstate, ad->uid ^ ad->nt, 0);
+
+       uint64_t lfsr = 0;
+       crypto1_get_lfsr(revstate, &lfsr);
+       crypto1_destroy(revstate);
+       
+       return lfsr;
+}